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ABSTRACT 
Today, vehicles are an important source of digital evidence in criminal investigations. Modern day 
cars store a wealth of digital information, including recent destinations, favorite locations, routes, 
and personal data, such as call logs, contact lists, SMS messages, pictures, and videos. Moreover, 
the growth of in-vehicle sensors and event data recorders, which continually provide feedback to 
automobile manufacturers and third-parties, provide tremendous potential for forensics examiners. 
Recently, the field of vehicle forensics research has caught the attention of both digital forensics 
investigators and academics. To date, most relevant research have conventionally focused on digital 
traces of multimedia and GPS systems found in vehicles. However, today vehicles are manufactured 
with a vast array of communication options, including Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and NFC (Near Field 
Communication). Up until recently, these options were reserved only for the more expensive 
automotive models; nonetheless these capabilities are now available for just about all vehicle models. 
However, these vehicle communications and their corresponding networks have not been explored 
in detail as they relate to traditional digital investigations. Consequently, this paper focuses on the 
communications produced by modern vehicles and identifies relevant and important artefacts. 
Furthermore, as a case study, we examine types of data that can be captured, and methods used to 
extract artefacts from this data. 
Keywords: Vehicle forensics , vehicle communication, vehicle security, forensic case study, 
Mercedes Benz car forensics 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Vehicle forensics is a relatively recent field of 
study, which has garnered interest from both 
academics and digital forensics investigators. 
Recent advances in technology, coupled with 
the introduction of new regulations, have 
generated more digital data and, consequently, 
provides a new source of valuable evidence for 
investigators. In terms of regulation, in some 
countries the government has mandated that all 
vehicles be manufactured with an event data 
recorder (EDR) , or "black box", which 
continually captures data points that include 
speed, reliability of brakes, seat belt usage and 
many other important metrics. Other advances 
in technology have created new sources of 
evidence for investigators. The integration of 
smart vehicle technologies, which are often 
based on open source operating systems, create 
even more digital breadcrumbs. For example, 
most digital entertainment systems, are based 
on Android, and come standard with vehicles 
today. It has become commonplace for our 
smartphones to automatically connect, via 
Bluetooth, with our vehicles and to synchronize 
the contacts from our smartphones to our cars. 
Moreover, vehicle navigation systems, which 
generally come standard with vehicles today, 
provide a wealth of information for 
investigators. Vehicle navigation system 
evidence can include trackpoints, waypoints, 
track logs and routes, among others. 
Today, vehicles contain a plethora of 
communication options, including Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth and NFC. Automobile manufacturer 
Mercedes Benz has been a pioneer in developing 
cutting-edge information technologies, many of 
which were first tested in their A-Class models 
in an effort to gain big data feedback from their 
consumers. 
The present-day existence of information 
technology in vehicles, and its use by vehicle 
manufacturers, began in 2002 with FMS (Fleet 
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Management System) , which allowed 
manufacturers to record live telemetry data, 
export it and, if necessary, provide real-time 
advice to truck owners to mitigate the risk of 
damage or prevent accidents. This information 
has resulted in companies being able to provide 
the optimal time and place where parts should 
be exchanged on a route and when inspections 
should be scheduled to avoid excessive delays. 
The increase in bandwidth in the mobile 
communications sector and the desire of 
customers to be permanently available creates 
an even greater digital footprint. These 
communication technologies were also 
introduced in passenger cars. Initially, cars 
maintained a Bluetooth transmitter to facilitate 
connections to the user's smartphone, but this 
has morphed into a GSM module, with a 
Bluetooth connection, NFC and Wi-Fi adapters 
[10]. These integrated vehicle communications 
have been further advanced with the 
introduction of Google Auto and CarPlay. 
Manufacturers develop applications to make the 
use of their vehicle smarter for the driver. 
Vehicle software updates occur wirelessly, and 
they also regularly transmit their telemetry data 
to the manufacturer. Tesla models communicate 
with other Tesla vehicles when in close 
proximity, which also facilitates updates. 
The aforementioned discussion illustrates 
how automobiles no longer simply rely on the 
on-board storage of data but rather appear to 
be closer to the concept of a Smart Home 
network [14]. Moreover, on-board vehicle 
memory is now merely used as a local cache. 
Thus, there have been significant changes in 
vehicle networking, data storage, 
communication and the user experience. These 
dramatic changes have not been adequately 
addressed in the academic literature or by 
digital forensics investigators. Instead, they 
continue to rely on existing, well-known 
practices, including monitoring 
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data, or have focused on the extraction of data 
stored in the memory chip [11] . 
On the other hand, this permanent 
communication also poses a danger to deployed 
forces, which influence traffic behavior and 
location data due to this uncontrolled outflow of 
data and the potential for external influence, 
without any physical influence on the vehicle. 
Furthermore, the entire storage of vehicle data 
also represents a danger to manufacturers for 
concealed / legendary working forces, as a 
legend would have to be extended to these 
points. For example, human trafficking is one of 
the most frequently committed crimes today. To 
date, the investigator has aspired to gather data 
from navigation systems and smartphones. If 
this evidence was not used, a smuggling ring was 
difficult to profile, as routes taken were not 
detected. Utilizing the recorded telemetry data, 
by means of the aforementioned FMS, one 
would be able to determine the route, its 
duration and rates of speed. Amongst other 
recorded metrics, contents of the FMS include 
vehicle speed, service and distance [1]. This 
shows that manufacturers store information 
that may be critically important to 
investigations. 
The purpose of this paper is to study 
communication data between the vehicle and 
the vehicle manufacturer, their value to 
investigators and the threat to their own 
assigned forces of security authorities. 
According to current opinion, data recorded 
from the vehicle flows directly to the vehicle 
manufacturer. Verified communication 
processes, representations of content and 
established data protocols could not be detected 
during the research phase. The contributions of 
this paper are: 
An innovative approach to analyzing 
data from vehicle communications; 
Explain the 
communication 
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telemetry, to in-vehicle network modules 
(Wi-Fi, NFC, and Bluetooth) and 
remote vehicle connections via 
smartphone applications; and 
A case study on a 2016 Mercedes Benz 
E-Class model. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. In the next section, we briefly review 
related work in the context of vehicle forensics. 
We present our research approach in Section 3, 
and then the case study is highlighted in Section 
4. We then describe our findings and analysis in 
Section 5. We provide a conclusion and discuss 
future work in Section 6. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Cars today contain a system similar to a 
network of computers with both wired and 
wireless connections. Hence, the probability for 
misuse of these communications has increased. 
Moreover, since many standards and protocols 
are identical to home networks, identical 
vulnerabilities exist [2]. 
Berla [3] with their iVe forensics tool, has 
been the preeminent force in vehicle forensics in 
recent times. The forensics data extracted can 
include travel routes taken by the driver, media, 
location information and connected devices. 
In 2011 , at the Usenix 2011, Checkoway et 
al presented an overview of the attack interfaces 
of a modern car [4]. Car manufacturers are not 
equipped to deal with these high-tech attacks, 
while network vulnerabilities persist. 
Car hacking continues to be problematic 
today, whereby a hacker could actually 
endanger the lives of people in a car by taking 
over the steering wheel or applying brakes. For 
example, a Jeep was hacked by Valasek and 
Miller, who presented at DefCon 2015 and the 
details of the compromised vehicle were 
described in a recent white paper [5]. Of 
particular note was their ability to control the 
Page 3
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steering wheel and make the car "turn sharp left" 
and then veer off the road. Another note is that 
they managed to successfully query every Jeep 
and car, with the same on-board unit, and 
determine their present location. It was however 
challenging to communicate with a single car, as 
opposed to communicating with just one 
targeted vehicle. 
Research conducted by ADAC, the German 
automobile club, discovered several weaknesses 
in BMW's ConnectedDrive [6]. It prompted 
BMW to introduce HTTPS connections to the 
factory, instead of maintaining weaker HTTP 
connections. 
Research conducted by the FIA in 2015, 
entitled "My car, My data" provided an 
overview of the data a car is collecting [7] on 
both drivers and passengers. It should be noted 
that not all similar data is sent over a mobile 
connection, while it can be read by the 
maintenance software of the manufacturer. 
In a briefing note, BigBrotherWatch.UK 
made several startling statements about the 
potential misuse of e-call [8]. Interpol informed 
the Sunday Times that e-call is already used by 
some police forces to track cars [9]. 
Apart from the technical possibilities, an 
ethical discussion arises if all of these 
possibilities can be used to fight crimes. One 
opinion is that by embarking on a life of crime, 
you are willingly sacrificing your privacy. 
Conversely, another opinion is that innocent 
citizens should not have to sacrifice their 
privacy [15]. 
In [10], the authors described some of the 
challenges associated with digital forensic 
investigations of vehicle systems. They 
demonstrated how artefacts of forensic interest 
could be recovered from the various electronic 
modules and placed such as memory chips of the 
entertainment system in a Volkswagen car. 
They did not discuss the vehicle communication 
data. 
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The authors in [11] addressed vehicle 
communications by demonstrating how to 
analyze mobile wireless data to examine the 
location and use of a vehicle. 
3.PROBLEM 
STATEMENT 
Nowadays, vehicles reside within a network 
where data is collected, transported and 
analyzed. More and more vehicles communicate 
with the automaker's server, via the provider's 
installed IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity) , while telemetry controllers are 
directly connected to the automaker's data 
center. Additionally, automobile exhibitors have 
already implemented an eCall called TPS 
(Third Party Service) in their systems. This 
protocol transmits a greater level of encrypted 
data in comparison to the EU directive and with 
the EU eCall service [16]. The manufacturers 
may continue to offer their own emergency 
service, TPS-eCall, as an alternative, in addition 
to being able to offer additional services. This 
will allow additional information to be obtained 
despite encryption. Statements made by the 
security authorities, in reference to the eCall 
system, view the system as being politically 
sensitive since the system has been a target for 
malware (backdoor) , which impacts some EU 
countries. Access to TPS systems, by the 
security authorities, has been facilitated with 
court orders. However, access to these systems 
has been quite restrictive. In this case, the car-
sharing operator would initially hand the data 
over to the court for evaluation, in response to 
an order from a higher regional court. These 
data were not handed over to the police 
investigative office. The opportunity to gain 
deeper insight into the communication process 
improves the probability of obtaining while also 
being more targeted. As a result , investigators 
and forensic scientists are faced with a quandary 
in the absence of legal standardization for this 
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In fact, data generated by devices connected 
to a Wi-Fi hotspot, is assumed to be the 
property of the official provider. Generally 
speaking, it is currently a complex matter to 
gain usable data from the communication traffic 
of vehicles. Most traffic is encrypted using SSL 
/ TLS in the TCP / IP model, and found within 
the transport layer. In addition, the encryption 
of data directly after its creation within the used 
system is of importance, as well as data which 
are kept ready for transport. This poses a 
problem for investigators and forensics analysts 
since the data is not readily available to be 
captured, analyzed and processed. 
Hence, the aim of this paper is to recognize 
how vehicles and computing centers 
communicate and which communication 
structures can be identified. Data is transmitted 
and analyzed by means of telecommunication 
monitoring. Nevertheless, it is important to 
clarify whether the previously legally required 
data is still sufficient or whether an adaptation 
of laws and technical systems is required. The 
existing traffic and its analysis are determined 
by the possible communication directions 
available via the Internet, for which a network 
module controls different communication paths: 
(i) Telemetry; (ii) Manufacturer Smartphone 
application remotely connected to the vehicle; 
(iii) Smart Device. 
In order to achieve the aforementioned 
objectives, the approach should be determined 
by the network protocols and 
telecommunication data, so that (i) 
communication directions can be tapped, (ii) 
protocols are recognized, (iii) content is 
evaluated and (iv) the necessary adjustments to 
systems and legal bases are recognized. 
4. CASE STUDY 
4 .1 E:xperiinent PJatform 
For this research paper, a Debian-based 
operating system, Kali Linux 2017.3, was used. 
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Wireshark v.2.4.6 was utilized to process 
archive files and parse individual frames. Dshell, 
with Decode v.3.0, was used for an advanced 
analysis of the converted files. A breakdown of 
the routes, addresses, and the associated stored 
content was performed with the OSINT ( Open 
Source Intelligence) tool Devploit v .3.6. 
The warden data packets, derived from the 
network traffic between the vehicle and server 
platform, are required. Through existing frames , 
and the information contained therein, an 
analysis can be performed, and a conclusion 
established. 
To perform this procedure, a vehicle model 
with a GSM/ UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications Service) module, which 
was a Mercedes-Benz E350 built in 2016, was 
selected. Using this module, all data generated 
within the vehicle, via control units , 
infotainment system, navigation system, 
Bluetooth and WiFi, we deactivated. To obtain 
a comprehensive overview, we collected data via 
telecommunication diversion. As a result , 
various file formats were created and 
subsequently converted. The stored data 
includes information about all of the systems 
involved, the time that the network connection 
was established, the amount of data, the route 
of the data transfer, the protocols and services. 
The vehicle can only be monitored if the 
IMEi (International Mobile Equipment 
Number) or the IMSI is transmitted to the 
provider. Since the data was not available on 
request from the vehicle dealer, the vehicle was 
monitored using an IMSI catcher. The mobile 
standard for each vehicle module can 
communicate while the IMSI is activated 
(Nederland, Vodafone Libertel in our 
experiments) 
A connection was established using a data 
call number + 882 39XXXXXXXXXX and this 
carrier code represents a number from Vodafone 
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Networks. This phone number is used to open 
and keep a data port using the GPRS service. 
Within the telecommunications monitoring 
system, only the outgoing call could be 
determined, and the phone number of the other 
party was unrecognizable. Subsequently, the 
various file formats and their functions were 
presented and followed by a complete telemetry 
communication between the control units of the 
vehicle and the target servers addressed by the 
various protocols. 
4.2 Data. 
In our case study, the raw data was collected by 
a third party, i.e. the provider, who adjusted the 
data to comply with the German 
Telecommunications Act. 
Snoop files 
The creation of the snoop files builds on the 
provider-created raw data. As previously 
mentioned, we are referring only data that the 
provider is obliged to produce by law. The snoop 
format was selected based on the underlying 
architecture of the telecommunications 
surveillance system. The telecommunication 
system wardens the raw data by communication 
string and converts it into a snoop archive. In 
order to carry out an analysis of this data, by 
means of the aforementioned programs, they 
were exported from the telecommunication 
system. Only pure network data, not 
telecommunication data can be exported. The 
disadvantage is that the connection cannot be 
represented by means of data packets. 
pcap files 
The pcap format stands for packet capture 
and utilizes a free network interface. By creating 
network data with the extension pcap, network 
analysis tools can analyze and process this data 
offline. 
The Snoop files are probabilistic Oracle 
Solaris archives. Although they are compatible 
with Wireshark, they are built on Kali Linux 
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command line utilities, e.g. it is not possible to 
use the network forensics framework Dshell (US 
Army Research Lab), as these concerted . pcap 
archives contain significant deficiencies in the 
information they contain. This deficiency is 
caused by the provider itself, as it represents a 
data overload for him. For example, this is 
characterized by missing MAC addresses in 
individual frames. 
As previously mentioned, the 
telecommunication monitoring system created 
archives for the communication setup / 
execution. For analysis and research of the 
communication channels these archives were 
summarized daily. 
4. 3 Car Telerri.etcy Inforrriation 
By definition, telemetry represents the remote 
measurement and transmission of measured 
values of a sensor ( control unit) located at a 
measuring location (vehicle) to a spatially 
separate location. This receiving station can 
collect, record and / or evaluate this data. The 
telemetry method used in this area is referred to 
as far field telemetry, since the measurement 
data is transmitted over longer distances. 
During our experimentation, our tests were 
performed using an integrated eSim 
GSM/ UMTS module. As a protocol for data 
transmission, the G PRS protocol ( General 
Packet Radio Service) was used. The 2017 test 
vehicle utilized an LTE (Long-Term Evolution) 
module. 
GPRS 
GPRS is a packet-oriented service, which 
allows a connection to be maintained without 
permanently reserving a radio channel. Only in 
a real data transmission, the radio room is 
occupied and is locked for other users. Another 
reason why this protocol is used is that delivery 
costs are calculated by volume of data rather 
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Akamai Technologies, Inc. is an American 
content delivery network ( CDN) and cloud 
service provider. Akamai's Content Delivery 
Network covers between 15% and 30% of all web 
traffic. [3] This hardware deployment represents 
a speed increase for website operators, as it 
always drives the server closest to the end user. 
This means that no original web pages of the 
domain are accessed, but web page copies on 
servers of Akamai Technologies. 
4. 4 Car Application Information 
For vehicle models with GSM / UMTS / LTE 
modules, the vehicle manufacturer offers 
applications for smartphone users. 
These provide the potential for (i) remote 
control of the vehicle, (ii) information transfer 
from current events, and (iii) personalization of 
ECUs (Engine Control Unit). 
The connection between the application and 
the vehicle communication servers are outside of 
the telemetry network. The use of the 
application ( s) requires registration and 
activation by the vehicle owner at the vehicle 
manufacturer, as well as the establishment of a 
user account. For this device, vehicle data from 
the vehicle registration, in addition to proof of 
ownership were needed. The following protocols 
and procedures were therefore recorded. 
This first communication setup was 
exported and displayed by Wireshark. 
As previously discussed under Devploit, the 
tool displays a variety of servers that are 
addressed by the application and supplied with 
information. In addition to various paths, that 
may have to do with the application itself, there 
are also two connections that represent 
"places.mercedes-benz.com" and "production-
suite.mercedes-benz.com". Both show yet 
another peculiarity that the data traffic is 
handed over to Akamai Technologies. The other 
available means of communications are via 
Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG). 
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4. 5 Car hi.tern.et Information 
In this section, the communication structure / 
process on the World Wide Web is considered. 
This consideration is limited to the first 
structure / process since all further processes are 
identical to a normal Internet communication. 
Before a communication to the Internet can 
take place, the IMSI of the installed eSIM 
module must be activated by the provider. The 
activation takes place in the customer center of 
the provider personally, an online registration is 
not provided. After this activation, devices 
connected to the vehicle 's Wi-Fi can dial IP 
addresses in the public area. Below are 
screenshots of the activation phase of the 
Internet Inthecar account (Figure 1). 
Interestingly, inquiries are initially made to 
Google and Apple and only then a request to 
Vodafone takes place. Here, was the expectation 
that Vodafone's communication platform would 
take place first and then the connections of the 
operating systems, applications and other data 
connections. 
This process means that the communication 
ports were opened from the outside and an 
internal configuration was not required. This is 
because Google and Apple made direct inquiries 
and set up a communication link. 
Another finding is the lack of device 
allocation, based on this network data, an 
assignment to a device is not possible, which can 
be of crucial importance in an investigation. 
Furthermore, no RTP (Real-Time 
Transport Protocol) stream was detected by 
Wireshark, as well as no Wi-Fi traffic. In 
contrast, in the package 4043, http information 
was sent which was "hotspot-detect" , which 
signals the successful connection to an access 
point. Due to the non-existent data, one can 
only interpret and speculate which devices are 






10.33.228.130:46861 -> 80.154.131.254:443 ** 
client sent 9.40 more than the server ** 
10.33.228.130:46863 -> 80.154.131.254:443 ** 
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4.6 Monitoring Wi-Fi module 
In order to detect and verify data processing 
algorithms, the previous Wi-Fi module was 
recorded using airodump-ng. This was done with 
a laptop connected to an Alfa Networks Wi-Fi 
antenna A WUS036ACH. 
4. 7 Artifact ca.pt-ming and 
extraction 
4 .7.1 Oshell 
The program Dshell represents a network 
forensic framework, which supports the 
decomposition of network acquisitions through 
plugins. Using Dshell, the required information 
of the pcap file was converted by decoder into a 
text file. 
Reverse-flow generates a message if the 
client transmits more data than the server. The 
default threshold value 3.0, means that the 
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client transmitting data is three times as much 
data as the server. This decoder is used to detect 
communication irregularities, since usually the 
data sent by the server is usually larger than the 
one supplied by the client. This may indicate 
that the client is sending more information at 
once because it has broken connections or 
contained information for forwarding to clients 
or servers that are not included in the TCP 
response of the server. The data obtained 
thereby shows us the source IP , which 
represents a private IP of the BTS, the 
destination IP , which is displayed to us in the 
form of an open IP and hereafter unit how many 
times more data the client sent to the server 
than vice versa. For example: 
... 
=,.;;.;,;,,~=- --"'""''l;_cll.;.";.,;l·:,:11.-1~ --------_,,IIIS""--_ _,,.,~ -a•W.t •ry1u_"1~ •-•t_MV-=-""--~--~------------' 
Fiqure 1. Activate phase of the Internet Inthecar account 
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netflow, Real-Time Transport Protocol 
(RTP) information were also generated., 
followstream content is displayed in the 
same sequence as it appeared on the network. 
This decoder was used to represent content of 
the data transfer. HTML was used to make the 
transport easier to capture. The area shown here 
has been reduced by the unreadable, encrypted 
areas. Subsequently, a connection between 
vehicle and server is shown, it was shown only 
data which were freely readable, except for t he 
area of the encrypted content data content 
which was not verified was deleted for better 
representation. 
4 . 7. 2 Devploit 
The Devploit tool [13] developed to gather 
information from Joker Security. It brings 
together various OSINT tools in the field of 
network reconnaissance. This tool chosen 
because, although several products are 
combined under one roof, they are not executed 
automatically. 
Telemetry data. The servers involved and 
the communication process show that 
investigations in a technical evaluation, without 
content analysis , can display modules that 
provide new starting points. The following 
diagram intended to clarify connection processes 
within the IP data network. The connection 
establishment and the keeping open of the data 
ports takes place via a GPRS call. This call used 
in all forms of communication (telemetry, 
remote app, InternetinTheCar) . The resulting 
problem areas discussed later. 
Remote Application Mercedes Me. 
Here it shown which requests, IPs and protocols 
the smartphone application uses, which 
connections established between the vehicle and 
the communication servers. The excerpts 
provided here intended to illustrate this overall. 
The vehicle dealer activated this application 
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shortly after the start of the surveillance. In the 
following examples, only the application 
compounds per se and hereafter two further 
compounds that are not directly used by the 
vehicle / application user but are used in direct 
connection with the vehicle manufacturer and 
the reseller. 
InternetlnTheCar. Vodafone. This is a 
Dutch eSIM of the provider Vodafone. This 
eSIM activated by Vodafone Germany. The 
activation took place personally with 
presentation of the identity card in a branch 
office of the provider; Resellers are not allowed 
to activate this service. 
5. FINDING AND 
ANALYSIS 
In this section we discuss the results extracted 
from our case study as noted in previous section. 
5 .1 Collecting the Il\11SI / Il\1EI 
IMSI/ IMEI was recorded in areas protected 
against radiation from other sources. It was 
found that the Mercedes-Benz E-Class has only 
one IMSI and transmits via an antenna in the 
rear window. The built-in Wi-Fi module 
connects as soon as the ignition of the vehicle is 
activated. By default, the Wi-Fi module is 
activated use for Internet communication with 
other devices are possible. 
Communication between the remote 
application and the vehicle may take place after 
activation by the dealer from whom the vehicle 
was purchased. Telemetry data is transmitted 
by the user without further activation. The 
infotainment / navigation system update is 
linked to an optional contract. Through these 
systems, the area of the live traffic is processed, 
which permanently updates traffic mediation, 
determined position and calculates optimal 
routes. With the vehicle having a TomTom 
navigation system installed, t he open access 
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from the vehicle DNS server to the TomTom 
Server could not be detected. 
The installed eSIM in this vehicle can 
implement the standards GSM (2G) and UMTS 
(3G) and tries to log in to the networks of 
Telekom Germany, Vodafone and 02 
respectively, i.e. the existing IMSI has no 
network lock and may be used as required 
register all networks available in Germany. 
These dial-up attempts are started as soon as 
the vehicle door is unlocked, further interaction 
is not required. A data traffic was interrupted 
with locked vehicle: this is probably due to the 
lack of power flow, as upon unlocking the closing 
mechanism direct contact to the DNS server 
recursive.ns241. net and thereby contacted to 
other servers and existing data. This shows that 
remote access to the vehicle, with locked 
security mechanisms, is not possible. 
5. 2 Export from the 
telecommunications system 
Data within the telecommunication monitoring 
system is assigned to an IMSI or IMEi. Each 
connection setup by means of GPRS is assigned 
to it data packets. We also noted that the 
monitored device is recognized by the user-agent 
being used. The user-agent is characterized by 
the fact that it represents the operating system 
used, the browser and the IT device used. 
Besides, due to the non-existent MAC 
address of the individual device, data 
assignment based on the packet data becomes 
impossible. This MAC address is only used for 
the internal connection (User Equipment -
Router on the DSL). Since the information is 
collected at the data output of the provider, 
these are not available. Therefore, it is 
absolutely necessary to store the entire 
telecommunications traffic, otherwise the 
connection to the used IMSI / IMEi will be lost. 
Another storage issue with the existing IMSI 
/ IMEi is that they can be cloned or assigned 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
CDFSL Proceedings 2019 
multiple times. It is not uncommon today that 
in an area where cheap phones exist, an IMEi is 
awarded multiple times, because the 
responsibility lies with the device manufacturer. 
It is also possible to clone an IMSI with little 
effort, but multiple entries in a base transceiver 
station are not possible. 
A switch within the used 1Pv4 can host 
several 100 users. In the telecommunications 
records two 1Pv4 are stored, both are internal 
IPs. On the one hand an IP for the client itself, 
which in this case is in the IP range 
10.XX.XX.XX and on the other hand the 
network identifier, which is located here in the 
range 192.168.XX.XX. Data that is not sent by 
the user-agent, does not leave any usable traces 
of equipment that can be directly assigned to 
the device in the network packets routed 
through the provider. 
5 .3 Monitoring Wi-Fi module 
The Wi-Fi module was monitored during a 
highway journey of 07:59:25 and 12:42:24 by 
means of the command airodump-ng and 
existing data packets were recorded. The aim of 
this surveillance was to compare findings from 
the monitoring of stationary access points with 
this Wi-Fi hotspot to detect any investigation 
approaches and to continue to obtain an 
estimate of wireless networks during a 
motorway journey, as the number of stationary 
access points is relatively small. In the higher-
level evaluation of the traffic on this interface, 
the following findings emerged (Table 1). 
The hotspot acts with a BSSID, which 
indicates by default the vehicle brand, the 
intended use and a consecutive number. 
Because Wi-Fi is switched on by default in the 
vehicle, it can detect and monitor from a greater 
distance (more than 1000m depending on the 
antenna module and environment). A data 
reception is eliminated at greater distance, here 
we can from a maximum distance of about 
200m. 
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 Description Value 
BSSID 9e:8d:7c:51:99:9c 
Channel 5 
SSID MB Hotspot 38724 
Percentage of packages 66.994378 
Percentage repetitions 11.915921 
Repetitions 5822 
Beacons 40128 
Data packets 190 
Probe requests 0 
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Table l. Wi-Fi- statistics - mb_lang-hi n.pcapng 
The channel used remained the same 
throughout the trial period, this is likely to be 
attributed to the fact that the bulk of the 
existing AP has channels 1,6,13 as the default 
and the company wanted to achieve a channel 
with as little access as possible to other access 
points for interference-free transmission. 
The number of beacons appears extremely 
high over a period of 4 hours, the test with an 
AVM router was about 1500 beacons per hour, 
a test with a VW T5 delivered 14000 beacons 
within one hour. Depending on the current state 
of knowledge, the transmission of the beacons is 
speed-dependent, the faster the vehicle was 
moved, the more beacons were sent. 
The collected test responses show the high 
number of wireless network modules that can be 
found on motorways today and the associated 
possibilities and risks this poses for security 
authorities. Of course, observation and 
surveillance missions are possible, so that it 
would be possible to build up distance to the 
target without losing sight of it. Conversely 
security also poses a threat to security agencies. 
Units have Wi-Fi routers, hotspots, laptops and 
smartphones and can easily identify to their 
counterparts. A frame analysis using Wireshark 
showed that the communication was completely 
handled in the 2.4 GHz range. This seemed 
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surprising at first glance, as the 2.4 GHz 
frequency band is being used by several other 
networks ( e.g. Bluetooth). Reasons for the 
restriction to this Wi-Fi frequency range could 
be initial costs, the lower energy output ( max 
100m W) and the compatibility with older 
devices. 
5. 4 InfoITI1ation content of the 
network packets 
With regard to the information provided in the 
network packets, it should be noted that there 
are major differences to normal packet captures. 
Entries are blank and aggravate or prevent 
automatic analysis of data packets. Especially 
in the field of network communication, this 
represents a barely surmountable data 
mountain. Within Wireshark, for example, there 
were no signs of RTP streams, they could not 
be captured by the existing analyses tools. 
Analyzing path and looking at a connection 
, Destinat ion: 11:911:H 11:81:H (N:11:91!1:ll:IN:tl ) 
Address: Be:11:ta_it :H:ee (H:81:11:88:N:N) 
.... .. I ................. • LCibit:Ci\obally 
... . .. ,1 .... ........ ,.,,• JGbit:Individui 
,. Source: H :H:HJ!ll:11:11 (11:H:H:11:11:111 
Address: N:ll:ta_et :11:81 (ll:N:11:88:ff :ll) 
, r-41Z5:71c,yte5Clnwln{&24b1Ul,71hlttttc:lllreG 
•IlllrltU ld: l lH~I 
lntHIK e ~ = Mk-
c.u,111l1ti ... type : £tllemtt (1) 
1~~::·~I,;~;~~~~}!· .. !~!!.~·~•!!!!.;!!_~~ 
Header checks1.11: lx.2S88 (validation disabled] 
(Header c~cksua status: Unverifitd] 
Source: 18,31.36,58 (18,31.36 ,58) 
Dtstination: recursive .ns247 .oet (89 .238.141.1811 
(Sourct ~ IP: Unknown] 
(Destination ~IP: lh'lknown) 
frame by using Dshell for (IP 10.31.26.50 -> IP 
89.238.141.181) we can have the results as in 
Figure 2. We also noted that GeoIPs are 
missing. A device detection to connect the data 
packets with devices and close the evidence 
chain cannot be done. This also applies to the 
actually existing wireless traffic, which cannot 
be implemented as such due to missing frame 
contents. 
Figure 2. Dshell analyzing of network packets 
Because the MAC signature is not 
transmitted, this is the only known way to 
preserve the MAC of the network module. Since 
these are not available within the network 
communication of the data stream, a stream 





a = recursive.ns247.net    89.238.141.181 
b1= recursive.ns247.net   89.238.141.181 
b2= recursive.ns247.net   89.238.161.35 
c1= Hermes-if.dvb.corpinter.net        195.243.210.46 
d1= Ssl-proxy-r55.dvb.corpinter.net  80.156.239.107 
e1= Cep-ssl-win.dvb.corpinter.net     80.154.131.251 
f1= Subs.snap.dvb.corpinter.net         80.154.131.207 
Abnormalities within the connection 
a= A one-off knock-on request; no response from the server 
b1= Represents the main DNS platform that connects to servers d1, e1, 
and f1 
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5. 5 fusights in.to servers and 
impacts 
In this topic communication lines in the areas of 
telemetry, InternetlnTheCar and smartphone 
application were shown. It is an eSIM UMTS 
module with the IMSI of the Dutch provider 
Vodafone Libertel. 
0 
Figure 3. Connection within the IP data network 
Both IMEi and IMSI were not available at 
the vehicle branch upon request. This IMSI 
establishes its communication via an MSISDN 
with the country calling code + 882 39, which 
belongs to Vodafone Malta and represents a 
catch-all for telephone services and is not 
dedicated to a single country. 
In the field of telemetry, data transmission 
and communication are only possible within the 
German territory. Only the DNS server is 
operated by M24 7 in England. This is probably 
due to the fact that they are working with 
Vodafone UK and provide their services on this 
network. This would be the only server within 
the telemetry data communication outside of 
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the scope of German law but currently 
subordinate to European law. 
The integrated systems show that the 
(Figure 3) providers of telecommunications 
services are broadening their scope of activities 
and making their expertise available to car 
manufacturers. From participating servers, it 
can be assumed that the integrated systems of 
Deutsche Telekom AG: hermesl-
if. dvb. corpinter. net, 
win. dvb. corpinter. net, 
if. dvb. corpinter. net, 
r55. dvb. corpinter. net 








data at least 
The cooperation between Mercedes-Benz 
and Telekom is also reflected in the fact that 
only two areas, belonging to the parent 
company Daimler, are fully integrated into this 
network structure. 
Surprisingly, the eSIM Vodafone can be 
assigned outside the structure of Mercedes-Benz 
/ Telekom. At the beginning of the investigation 
preparation, the question arises as to what 
extent Vodafone Libertel Netherlands would be 
involved in the data flow. The promising, yet 
globally, expected answer was "Not at all." The 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) is Vodafone US, 
which also receives all requests from the client. 
The Autonomous System (AS) belongs to 
Vodafone Italia, where the answers come back 
to the client. The AS is reported in Germany, 
Frankfurt / Main, presumably as a result of the 
eSIM being activated in Germany. 
The MeConnect application from Mercedes-
Benz is divided into its communication 
behavior. While the application within the 
server structure of the Deutsche Telekom AG 
has its information base, presumably due to the 
impact on facilities ( such as auxiliary heating) 
and safety devices ( such as locking system). The 
MeAccount has been connected to the Daimler 




Vehicle Communication within Networks ... 
Suite areas, which will guide him / her through 
Akamai Technologies. 
5. 6 Further discus5ion 
The use of an IMSI catcher was chosen to 
capture the complete communication of the 
vehicle. Conducting monitoring by logging onto 
existing Wi-Fi would not have the desired 
outcome, because only the communication for 
the connected devices would have been 
detected. 
By discharging directly from the provider 
Vodafone all transmitted data of the SIM card 
could be extended. These showed new problems 
in their evidential value and meaningfulness. By 
recogmzmg this problem, legal and 
technological measures can be taken by the 
legislator in cooperation with the provider and 
the Federal Network Agency. 
Monitoring of the Wi-Fi module has shown 
that a large number of Wi-Fi beacons can be 
used in the field of reconnaissance and 
observation missions in the security regulatory 
environment. 
Intrusion from outside by crackers of the 
password can be ruled out due to the length and 
variability (14 characters, Upper, Lower, Digit). 
However, it is also possible to create an Evil 
Twin and use it [12]. 
Finally, the localization of the server 
structure and the global use of individual 
country resources of a provider were discussed. 
Here we can still see approaches to receiving 
data that were not stored within Germany, but 
as in this case, a phone number. The provider 
recognized by the IMSI also had no influence or 
reference to communication processes and 
several globally branched distributions of the 
provider and their tasks within the service order 
Internetlnthecar could be recognized. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND 
FUTURE-WORK 
The objective of this paper was to examine how 
data is generated by a car or routed through the 
car's network gateway. Knowledge of this data 
flow and its intermediate and final storage 
locations enables the security authorities to use 
it in preliminary investigations and to assess the 
risks of vehicle/ technology use in their own 
operational procedures. Data of a vehicle were 
collected for this paper. This applies to both 
telemetry and remote application data, as well 
as the interconnection data of the mobile service 
provider. The vehicle data was analyzed and 
disseminated using various procedures / 
programs to provide a basis for assessing 
Internet of Things Mobility infrastructures. 
This paper has shown that contents and 
communication endpoints can be identified and 
further analysis approaches can be made, and 
under certain circumstances access and 
localization of the vehicle is possible. This also 
shows opportunities as well as risks which 
security authorities can have in dealing with the 
networked mobile areas of the Inter of Things 
[17]. In addition, a one-sided processing or 
forensic analysis will provide less and less useful 
information, only the way of holistic 
consideration will contribute to the 
investigation of criminal offenses or to the 
protection of one's own forces in the future. 
Several times during the paper it was shown 
that the generated data throughput leads to the 
use of the vehicle, the devices connected to the 
Wi-Fi or the smartphone application. 
In terms of future work, in order to get a 
strong accentuated picture here, a fragmented 
data analysis for different vehicle manufacturers 
/ groups should be conducted to evaluate them 
in context. Furthermore, consideration of the 
various domestic and foreign mobile service 
providers in this area would be an important 
consideration. In addition to the actual data 
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flow, the area of data (intermediate) storage 
would be of decisive importance here. 
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